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I.

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of September 2005, the world watched live news
coverage of thousands of people stranded without food, water, medicine, or
sanitation in a flooded New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina made landfall.'
*
Adjunct Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Camden. I would like-to thank Beth
Hillman, Greg Lastowka, and Rachel Weidler for their comments on an earlier version of
this paper, as well as the Northern Illinois University Law Review staff for its excellent
work.
1. Bush to Send More Troops to Louisiana, Fox NEWS, Sept. 3, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly-story/0,3566,168398,00.html;
Relief Workers
Confront
'Urban
Warfare',
CNN,
Sept.
1,
2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/O9/01/katrina.impact.
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Many of the local police had abandoned their posts, 2 and there were reports3

of riots, looting, and sniper fire from those first responders who remained.
People who did not evacuate before the hurricane hit were herded into the
convention center and the Superdome;4 most of these people were poor 5and
minorities with no means to escape the city and with nowhere else to go.
While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and city,
state, and federal governments pointed fingers and engaged in a war of
words, 6 these citizens remained stranded in conditions that many never
thought would occur in one of the largest cities in the richest country in the
world. 7 After several days, the National Guard and active-duty troops from
the 82nd Airborne arrived.8 Under the command of Lieutenant General
Honor6, 9 armed
soldiers quickly restored the peace and rapidly evacuated
0
the refugees.'

2.
James Varney, Four Officers Suspended, Acting Police Chief Says, NOLA.COM,
Sept.
30,
2005,
http://www.nola.corm/weblogs/print.ssf?/mtlogs/nola-tporleans/archives/print83860.html.
Acting New Orleans Police Chief, Warren Riley, reported that he had suspended four officers and was investigating many more concerning accusations of police looting. Id. He also
pointed out that many of the 249 officers that did not show up for work during the Katrina
aftermath may have actually been working in other areas, or were trapped like other residents. Id. Riley reported that he would be holding tribunals to investigate each case. Id.
3. Sniper Fire Halts Hospital Evacuation, CNN, Sept. 1, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/09/01/katrina.hospital.sniper/index.html.
4.
Relief Workers Confront 'Urban Warfare', supra note 1.
5. Jesse Washington, Katrina,Aftermath Galvanizes Black America, USA TODAY,
Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-08-katrina-blackresponse-x.htm.
6.
Unlike 9/11, Katrina Divides Rather Than Unifies America, USA TODAY, Sept.
9,
2005,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-09-katrinaunity.x.htm. The internal documents released by the Governor's office in 2005 as part of an
ongoing congressional investigation show that the power of Louisiana and public relations
were where much of the concerns were directed. Katrina Documents Released, CNN, Dec.
4, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/12/03/katrina.docs.ap/index.html.
7.
Troops Told 'Shoot to Kill' in New Orleans, ABC NEWS, Sept. 9, 2005,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2005/09/02/1451906.htm.
8.
Convoys Bring Relief to New Orleans, CNN, Sept. 2, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/ katrina.impact/index.html.
9.
Lt. Gen. Honor6, 57, and a Louisiana native, commanded the First Army, which
is based at Fort Gilem in Forest Park, Georgia. Lt. Gen. Honore a 'John Wayne Dude',
CNN, Sept. 3, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/honore.profile/index.html. He took
charge in New Orleans and quickly gained the respect of Mayor Nagin, who later dubbed
Honor6 a "John Wayne dude." Id. Honor6 had a hands-on approach to dealing with the
situation in New Orleans-he rode around in his "office," the back of an Army truck, in
order to survey and direct based on firsthand observation. Id. He was focused on the humanitarian needs of people and likened his task to "hav[ing] 20,000 people come to supper." Id.
10.
Id. The troops brought order, sustenance, and hope, but the plight of the refugees did not end there. Peter Whoriskey & Susan Levine, Guard Troops Descend on New
Orleans, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2005, at Al. The refugees then waited in long lines to be
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The people of the nation demanded answers. Why did the federal government wait so long to send aid? Why did the federal government ignore
the repeated, impassioned pleas for help from local and state officials? Why
did the President respond so quickly and compassionately after the 9/11
attacks but fail to do the same during the Katrina disaster?" 1
The Department of Defense (DOD) explained that it would have been
illegal for the government to send the military into New Orleans. 12 Such
action would violate the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (PCA), which criminalizes the use of the military in law enforcement.' 3 But, does providing
humanitarian aid such as food, water, medical assistance, and rescue services qualify as a violation of the PCA?
In this article, I explore how the Posse Comitatus Act would apply to
the Katrina disaster. In Part II, I discuss the history of the Posse Comitatus
Act, including a summary of some of its many judicial and congressional
expansions. In Part III, I apply the PCA to the Hurricane Katrina disaster to
show that, under its proper application, the PCA does, in fact, permit the
lawful use of the military for humanitarian purposes. Based on this analysis,
I conclude that we should focus our efforts less on the Posse Comitatus Act,
and more on fixing the real problem behind the delayed rescue of the New
Orleanians.
II.
A.

THE HISTORY OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

THE PASSAGE OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

In 1878, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibited
the use of the standing military "as a posse comitatus or otherwise to exe-

shipped by bus to Houston, where they slept on cots in the middle of the field in one of the
city's sports arenas. Id. at A18. The Astrodome was expected to house 15,000 citizens with
the remaining thousands of evacuees going to Reliant Arena and the convention center
downtown. Id.
11.
Judy Keen & Richard Benedetto, A Compassionate Bush Was Absent Right
After Katrina, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-0908-bush-compassionx.htm.
12.
Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Military May Propose An Active-Duty Forcefor
Relief Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A15. Interestingly, the first explanation regarding the delay came from former FEMA Director, Michael Brown, who claimed that there
had been a breakdown in communication: the federal government did not know that people
were stranded at both the convention center and the Superdome. The Big Disconnect on New
Orleans, CNN, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005[US/09/02/katrina.response/. This
excuse is not very compelling considering that CNN had been running twenty-four-hour live
news coverage reporting the locations of the stranded individuals.
13.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
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cute the laws." 1 4 There was, however, confusion over exactly what the PCA
meant.
There was a general consensus that the short-term goal of the PCA
15
was to prevent future abuses like those seen during the Reconstruction Era
by ending the federal troop presence at state elections 6 and by repealing the
Cushing Doctrine.1 7 Basically, it clarified that civilian marshals could no
longer call forth the Army into a posse comitatus.
Some supporters also believed that the PCA reinforced the American
tradition of limiting military involvement in civilian affairs 8 and barred the
use of federal troops to enforce domestic law-except where explicitly
enumerated by statute. 19 Others, including President Hayes,2 ° subscribed to
the view that the PCA merely reaffirmed the existing state of the law: the
use of federal troops required an alternative authorization from the Constitution or Congress, and the President had such authorization inherently in
the Constitution and by statute in the Militia Acts.21
In 1882, the Senate Judiciary Committee expressly confirmed the later
meaning of the PCA:
The posse comitatus clause referred to arose out of an implied authority to the marshals and their subordinates executing the laws to call upon the Army just as they would
upon bystanders who, if the Army responded, would have
command of the Army or so much of it as they had, just as

14.
Posse Comitatus Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 152 (1878) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006)).
15.
Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record
Straighton 124 Years of Mischief andMisunderstandingBefore Any More Damage is Done,
175 ME. L. REV. 86, 109 (2003).
16.
Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Construction and Application of Posse Comitatus
Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1385), and Similar PredecessorProvisions, Restricting Use of United
States Army andAir Force to Execute Laws, 141 A.L.R. FED. 271, 282 (1997).
17.
Felicetti & Luce, supra note 15, at 116. The Cushing Doctrine allowed marshals
(low ranking officials) to summon Army troops into the posse comitatus. Felicetti & Luce,
supra note 15, at 115.
18.
See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 146-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (pointing
out that this is not an absolute limitation-Congress can authorize military usage in special
circumstances that are expressly authorized).
19.
See United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1139 (10th Cir. 2004).
20. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 15, at 119. President Hayes did not feel as though
the PCA applied to action by the President. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313 (1957), 1957 US AG
LEXIS 2, 34-35 (pointing to Hayes's diary of July 30, 1878).
21.
Paul Jackson Rice, New Laws and Insights Encircle the PCA, 104 MR. L. REV.
109, Ill (1984).
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they would of the bystanders, and would direct them what
to do.22
Thus, the domestic use of the military continued in more or less the
same capacity as it had before the passage of the PCA, which made the
PCA seem unsuccessful. For example, between 1877 and 1945, the military
was involved in domestic affairs 125 times.23 In fact, the first use occurred
only a couple months after Hayes signed the PCA when he sent troops to
quell a civil disorder in Lincoln County, New Mexico. 24 During this deployment, federal troops spent more than a year enforcing local law-a
deployment no different from the pre-PCA deployments of Jefferson and
Jackson.
In 1956, the PCA was amended to include the Air Force, 26 which returned the PCA to public debate. After another modification in 1959,27 the
PCA began to emerge as a defense tactic in criminal trials, which led to
both judicial and congressional action to clarify its coverage and proper
application.
In the 1970s, the federal courts started narrowing PCA protections and
set different boundaries for PCA infractions. 29 In the 1980s, Congress clari-

22.
13 CONG. REc. 3455, 3458 (1882) (remarks of Senator Edmunds on behalf of
the Judiciary Committee).
23.

CLAYTON D. LAURIE & RONALD COLE, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY

FORCES IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS 1877-1945, at 42 (1997).
24. Id. at 58-59, 68.
25.
Pursuant to the Militia Act of 1795, President Thomas Jefferson instituted "an
instantaneous levee en masse" of "all officers having authority, civil or military, and all
other persons" to stop a rumored insurgency, led by former Vice President Aaron Burr, to
start a war in the Spanish Territory. MERRILL PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW
NATION 851 (1975); H.W.C. Furman, Restrictions upon the Use of the Army Imposed by the
Posse Comitatus Act, 7 MIL. L. REv. 85, 88-89 (1960). President Andrew Jackson used a
similar "calling forth" power, under the 1807 Insurrection Act, to send troops to South Carolina in 1832 to prevent the state's secession from the Union. H.W.C. Furman, Restrictions
upon the Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, 7 MIL. L. REv. 85, 89 (1960).
Also see CLAYTON D. LAURIE & RONALD COLE, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES

IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS 1877-1945, at 59-73 (1997), for a recounting of the deployment of
federal troops to quell the civil disorder in Lincoln County, New Mexico.
26.
The original version of the PCA only included the Army. The impetus for the
change was that the Air Force had recently separated from the Army. Posse Comitatus Act,
ch. 1041, § 18(a), 70A Stat. 626 (1956) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006)).
27.
Removing the sentence, "This section does not apply in Alaska." Posse Comitatus Act, Pub. L. No. 86-70, § 17(d), 73 Stat. 144 (1959) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1385 (2006)).
28.
Felicetti & Luce, supra note 15, at 86, 144.
29.
Sean Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward A Right to Civil
Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 383, 398 (2003).
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fled the judicial standards by passing rather expansive exceptions to the
PCA in connection with the War on Drugs.3 °
The Posse Comitatus Act, in its current form, provides that:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,
willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.3 '
B.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

1.

Laird v. Tatum: The "Regulatory, Proscriptive,or Compulsory" Standard

In the late 1960s, the PCA entered the public arena when President
Johnson sent federal troops 32 to assist local law enforcement in quelling
civil uprisings in Detroit, Michigan,3 3 and to deal with disturbances that
emerged after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.34 As a result
of these operations, the Army instituted a preventative measure to collect
information about the activities of people who were thought to have the
potential to cause future disorders.35
The constitutionality of this surveillance sparked a congressional investigation. 36 Then, in 1972, several groups targeted by these military
measures alleged that the mere presence of this surveillance had a "chilling" effect on their right to free speech and expression as guaranteed by the
First Amendment.37
In Laird v. Tatum, the Supreme Court sided with the government regarding these surveillance tactics and found no "actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action"; therefore, the claimants had no justiciable cause of action.38 The Court saw the
30.
Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 129 (2003).
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
31.
10 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
32.
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1972).
33.
34.
Id. at 5.
35.
Id. at 6.
There was a hearing held in the form of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
36.
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Id. at 7. This congressional investigation
sparked an internal Army investigation that resulted in a cutting back of domestic surveillance activities. Id.
37.
Id. at 3.
38.
408 U.S. 1, 6 (1972).
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military's activity as squarely permitted under 10 U.S.C. § 331, reasoning
that collecting intelligence was a necessary part of acting in a back-up law
enforcement capacity.39 Without more than a "foreseeable" misuse of the
information by the military, the Court found that the "chilling effect" standard was not met because the complainants were not subjected to governmental power that was "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature. ' 4° At the end of his opinion, Justice Burger acknowledged the American tradition of keeping the military out of civilian affairs and expressed
confidence that illegal military intrusion, if it were to occur, would not go
unchecked.4'
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Marshall, issued a blistering dissent
charging that there was no expressed or implied grant of authority allowing
military surveillance over civilians 42 and that "surveillance of civilians is
none of the Army's constitutional business. 43 He also pointed out that the
Court severely underestimated the egregiousness of the Army's actions and
the seriousness of the issue itself.44
Douglas asserted that the Army was infiltrating these groups with undercover agents and running an extensive surveillance program with a goal
of collecting much more than ordinary public information.45 Douglas found
that this behavior was clearly a constitutional violation-a limitation on the
complainants' freedom of speech rights.46 Nonetheless, the Laird v. Tatum
interpretation began a trend leading to increased military involvement in
domestic law enforcement.47
39.
Id. at 5-6.
40.
Id. at 11.
41.
Id. at 16. "There is nothing in our Nation's history or in this Court's decided
cases, including our holding today, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that
actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied." Id. This quote begs the question of whether Burger had heard of the
Revolutionary War and the Reconstruction Era. Earlier in the opinion, Burger quoted the
oral argument where the Court pointed out that the writ of habeas corpus was the check to
keep the Army from "com[ing] in with its list of troublemakers... [and] rounding up people
and putting them in military prisons somewhere." Id. at 8 n.5. Thus far, the courts have not
taken the hard line that Burger seemed to think was appropriate.
42.
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 16 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("One can
search the Constitution in vain for any such authority.").
43.
Id. at 27.
44.
Id. at 24 ("The surveillance of the Army over the civilian sector-a part of
society hitherto immune from its control-is a serious charge.").
45.
Id. at 26-27.
46.
Id. at 26. "The present controversy is not a remote, imaginary conflict." Id.
"This case involves a cancer in our body politic. It is a measure of the disease, which afflicts
us. Army surveillance, like Army regimentation, is at war with the principles of the First
Amendment." Id. at 28.
47.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 401.
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The Wounded Knee Cases

Not long after Laird v. Tatum, the PCA resurfaced in the federal courts
when several defendants pleaded a PCA violation as their defense during
prosecutions stemming from a standoff in Wounded Knee, South Dakota.
On February 27, 1973, over 100 people looted a trading post and took a
number of Wounded Knee residents hostage for several days.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
were the primary responders, but were aided by officers from the 82nd Airborne4 8 and the National Guard. 49 Military forces were sent without a presidential mandate under 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-332 because the government did
not want to conjure up memories of past altercations between the military
and Native American Indians.50 Nevertheless, the military provided invaluable tactical advice and equipment; an Army colonel even had a vote in
final decisions.5 1
After the standoff between law enforcement and looters ended, several
people were arrested and prosecuted for violating the Civil Obedience Act
of 196852 for smuggling weapons to be used against law enforcement personnel. 53 At trial and on appeal, the defendants claimed that the participation of the military violated the PCA.54 They argued that the officers were
not acting under their official duties as law enforcement personnel, which
negated one of the elements of the Civil Obedience Act.55 The three district
courts presiding over the cases each
interpreted the PCA differently and
56
returned three separate standards.
In United States v. Red Feather,the District of South Dakota held that
the PCA was not violated because there was no "direct active use" of the
48.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 401. Colonel Warner's primary role was to advise the
Department of Defense and the Justice Department of the progress, but he turned out to be
more of an active participant. Kealy, supra note 29, at 401.
49.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 383, 401. The Nebraska National Guard provided aerial
reconnaissance and the South Dakota National Guard maintained Army-provided equipment.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 383, 401.
50.
United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1975), afftd, 541
F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976).
51.
Id. at 195. Colonel Warner admitted in his report and testimony that he had a
vote in final decisions. Id.
52.
Civil Disobedience Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title X, § 1002(a), 82 Stat.
90 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 231-233 (2006)).
53.
See United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975); McArthur,
419 F. Supp. 186; United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974).
54.
Red Feather,392 F. Supp. 916; McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186; Jaramillo, 380 F.
Supp. 1375.
55.
Red Feather,392 F. Supp. 916; McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186; Jaramillo, 380 F.
Supp. 1375.
56.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 403.
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military at Wounded Knee.5 7 For this reason, the evidence of military involvement was not relevant and was altogether inadmissible at trial.5 ' After
examining the legislative history of the PCA, the court determined that it
was not Congress's intent to preclude civilian law enforcement from using
military advice and supplies in a passive role, 59 and it held that there was no
PCA violation because the military had acted only in an advisory capacity. 60 Ultimately, the defendants were convicted.6 '
In United States v. Jaramillo, the District of Nebraska set a "pervading" standard and acquitted the defendants because this threshold was not
met.62 After looking closely at the facts of the case, the court found that the
extensive involvement of the military officers was problematic and cast a
reasonable doubt on whether they had been lawfully engaged in law enforcement duties.63 The court was quick to add that it was not finding that
the conduct at issue was a violation of the PCA--only that the prosecution
failed to meet its burden of proof.64
In United States v. McArthur, the District of North Dakota, after reviewing the Red Featherand Jaramilloopinions, applied the Laird standard
because of the importance of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms protected by the PCA. 65 The court dismissed the Jaramillo standard as "too
vague' 66 and the Red Feather standard as "too mechanical. 67 The reasoning was that a clear standard that could be applied to borderline cases was
required, and the "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory ' 68 standard of
Laird fit the bill.69
After applying the Laird standard, the McArthur court found that the
officers acted lawfully under the PCA.70 The court disagreed with the
57.
Red Feather,392 F. Supp. 916, 923.
Id. at 923-24.
58.
59. Id. at 922 (noting that this issue was not even discussed during the debates).
McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 195.
60.
Id.
61.
62.
United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Neb. 1974).
63.
Id. at 1381.
64. Id. ("Lest anyone be misled, let it be emphasized that this court is not finding
that the actions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents or the United States marshals
were unlawful or that anyone violated 18 U.S.C. § 1385, the posse comitatus statute. The
prosecution's burden was to prove in court that the actions of those officers were lawful. It
failed to carry that burden. My holding means no more than that.").
65.
McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194.
66. Id. (stating that Judge Urbom's rule "requires a judgment to be made from too
vague a standard").
67. Id. (noting that the Red Feather standard is "too mechanical, and inevitably
when the rule is applied to borderline cases, it will crumble at the edges").
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194-95.
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Jaramillo assessment of the role of the officers because they were "borrowed as a vehicle might be borrowed," and the loaning of equipment between branches of the government was permitted under the PCA. 7 1 The
McArthur court also found that the officers acted as advisors because they
were not giving orders and because police officials still needed to check
with their superiors before making major decisions.72 Even though it did not
find a PCA violation, the McArthur court still admitted the evidence of the
military involvement because it was relevant to the government's proof of
the elements of the charge.73
On appeal in United States v. Casper, the Eighth Circuit settled the
matter by affirming McArthur, which adopted the "regulatory, proscriptive,
or compulsory" standard, and found that the evidence of military activity
was relevant.74 This court had already denied the government's appeal of
the Jaramillo decision more than a year earlier.75 Thus, Casper meant that
the defendants who were acquitted under the lower Jaramillo standard were
home free,76 while the Red Feather and McArthur convictions, which
stemmed from the same incident of military activity as in Jaramillo,were
affirmed.77
C.

THE "DIRECT ACTIVE USE" STANDARD

Shortly after the Wounded Knee Cases, Congress adopted the "direct
active use" standard from Red Feather, which covered a wide variety of
military actions. 78 Subsequent DOD directives adopted the McArthur standard for when the Marine Corps or Navy, which were exempt from the
PCA, acted in a law enforcement capacity likely to "subject civilians to
[the] use [of] military power that is regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory.,, 79 This congressional activity still left ambiguities in the boundaries
of the PCA, and courts continued to tease out the "direct active use" standard.8 °

71.
Id. at 195.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 194.
74.
United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
75.
United States v. Jaramillo, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975).
76.
Id.
77.
Casper,541 F.2d at 1276.
78.
United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 923 (D.S.D. 1975).
79.
Department of Defense Directive 5525.5, Enclosure 4.3.2 (Jan. 15, 1986),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5525-5.pdf.
80. Red Feather,392 F. Supp. at 921.
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The "direct active use" standard sets a high threshold and requires
egregious 8t participation of military personnel in law enforcement in order
to violate the PCA.8 2 The action needs to constitute direct involvement,83
such as affecting a search of a person or property off-base, 84 seizing evidence, 85 pursuing escaped civilian prisoners, 86 or investigating crimes. 87
Enhancing law enforcement,88 aerial reconnaissance or surveillance,89
transporting defendants, 90 and providing resources 9' are sufficiently passive
activities to be found acceptable under this standard. Basically, military
personnel need to go above and beyond what a civilian aiding law enforce-

81.
See, e.g., United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no
violation of the PCA where an Air Force plane was used, in the beginning stages of a sting,
to transport a car and drugs from one state to another because the Act had no direct impact
on the defendants). There needed to be some direct, personal connection to the military
participation-like searching or confining defendants, or searching the defendant's property-to violate the Act. Id.
82.
Even if it does rise to the direct active use standard, the conduct may still be
lawful if there is a constitutional or congressional grant of authority.
83.
See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 2005) (concluding that
conducting DUI blood tests on behalf of civilian law enforcement would violate the Act
because it constitutes direct participation in civilian law enforcement).
84.
Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (holding that a United
States Army Central Intelligence Division [CID] agent who bought drugs undercover, drew
a gun when the defendant was arrested, searched the defendant's house, secured and delivered evidence from the scene, and completed paperwork regarding evidence violated the
PCA because these actions "pervaded civilian law enforcement").
85.
Id.
86.
Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (holding that
the use of an Air Force helicopter in a search for an escaped civilian prisoner violated the
Act).
87.
State v. Pattioay, 896 P.2d 911, 922 (Haw. 1995) (holding that the PCA was
violated when CID agents went undercover and participated in off-base drug buys as part of
an investigation because the target was a civilian and there was no verified connection with
military personnel).
88.
Hayes v. Hawes, 921 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that military
activity was too passive to be considered a violation of the PCA where the Naval Investigative Service [NIS] shared information with local law enforcement, helped with surveillance,
and bought drugs undercover).
89.
United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that cooperation between Air Force and Customs-including locating and monitoring an unidentified
plane-that led to the arrest of the defendants for illegally importing drugs into the United
States did not reflect direct military involvement in violation of the PCA).
90.
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (determining that
the Navy's actions in caring for, transporting, and housing the defendant while the defendant
was in FBI custody was sufficiently passive because military personnel were not executing
any civilian laws).
91.
People v. Bautista, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 868 (Cal. App. 2004) (finding no violation of the PCA where an Army dog and handler assisted a DEA agent by signaling the
smell of marijuana, which led to the obtainment of a search warrant, because the use was not
pervasive and the handler did not participate in any other way in the investigation).
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ment would do, or they need to be an integral part of the process for their
behavior to cross the line.
For example, in 2005 in United States v. Johnson, the Fourth Circuit
found that military participation in DUI blood testing of civilians crossed
the line because the actions of the military personnel would have had a direct impact on the defendants.9 2 The reasoning of the court was that the
blood evidence would determine whether or not the defendants were guilty,
and unless the defendants arranged a plea agreement, military personnel
would have to testify regarding the evidence collection and the testing procedures used. 93 Congress had not authorized searches by military personnel,
94
and this action was clearly a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.
Regardless, the court found no PCA violation had occurred. The court
noted that while there was proof that the blood test was conducted at the
Armed Forces Institute, there was no evidence that it had actually been performed by military personnel.95 Without
such proof, the court would not
96
find a violation of a criminal statute.
D.

MILITARY BRANCH AND STATUS

Since judicial interpretation of the branch component of the PCA is
more straightforward than the active use analysis, courts apply a plain language standard. 97 The PCA specifically states that it applies to the Army
98
and Air Force, and those are the two branches covered under the statute.
92.
410 F.3d 137, 148 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id.
93.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 149.
96.
Id. This logic sounds reasonable at first glance-we do not want to put an innocent person in prison unless we have substantial proof. However, no one has been prosecuted
for a violation of the PCA. Is this really even a threat? Assuredly, defense counsel during a
PCA prosecution in such a case would raise the issue.
97.
United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that the
plain language of the PCA does not include the Navy); see also United States v. Walden,
490 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1974) (determining that the PCA does not apply to the Marines).
98.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). An amendment to extend the PCA to the Navy failed
in 1975. The text of that proposed change read:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, knowingly uses any part of the
Army, Navy, or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute
the laws is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to affect the law enforcement of the United States
Coast Guard.
Felicetti & Luce, supra note 15, at 144 n.286.
The PCA was originally passed as a rider to an Army appropriations bill for the
purpose of restricting funding for troops summoned unlawfully. Walden, 490 F.2d at 374.
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Although the PCA does not include the Marine Corps" or the Navy,' °°
the Navy has self-imposed a regulation that adopts the PCA policy but does
not criminalize its violation.10 1 Additionally, the PCA only applies to soldiers in service under title 10, which means that it does not include the National Guard, unless they are federalized,10 2 or the Coast Guard.l0 3
Interestingly, National Guardsmen can act in law enforcement capacities if they are under state command because of their dual membership 104
10 5
status in both their state National Guard and the Federal National Guard.
In Gilbert v. United States, the Sixth Circuit explained that the default
status of guardsmen is state service until they are called into federal service
under a congressional statute.I°6
The main factor used to determine a guardsmen's service status is to
whom they are reporting, rather than who pays them, their full-time status,
or their appearance to onlookers.107 If their commander in chief is the Governor, they are state guardsmen. 0 8 If their commander in chief is the President, they are considered federal troops. 1°9
E.

COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS

In addition to congressional exceptions to the PCA, there are two major common law exceptions-private citizen and independent military purTherefore, it was originally applied to the Army. Id. at 374-75. However, the PCA was extended to include the Air Force after the Air Force split from the Army. Id.
99.
Walden, 490 F.2d at 374-75.
100.
Id. at 374; see also United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (holding that the PCA did not apply to the Navy personnel that arrested the defendant).
101.
Walden, 490 F.2d at 374.
102.
United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding no PCA violation where the National Guard assisted in surveillance because they were not in federal
service at the time, but were rather assisting state troopers).
103.
The Coast Guard is both a federal law enforcement body and a part of the military. 14 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (2006); United States v. Chaparro-Almeida, 679 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that the PCA was not violated where the Coast Guard seized the defendant at
sea because the PCA does not apply to the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard is specifically
permitted to participate in federal law enforcement by statute); see also Jackson v. State, 572
P.2d 87, 93 (Alaska 1977) (declining to find a PCA violation where the Coast Guard investigated the crime in question because Congress did not intend the PCA to apply to the Coast
Guard, and because the Coast Guard is specifically qualified to act in such a capacity).
104.
National Guardsmen have dual-membership in the National Guard of their state
and the National Guard of the United States.
105.
See United States v. Gilbert, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999).
106.
See id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
See generally Gilbert, 165 F.3d at 473.
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pose. Under the private citizen exception, there is no violation of the PCA if
military personnel work with law enforcement as private citizens. If the
individual's military status was "merely incidental" to his interaction with
authorities, he acted as a civilian.110 In many cases involving the private
citizen exception, military servicemen aided local law enforcement during
off-duty hours by providing information on their own habits in order to
secure the dismissal of pending civilian criminal charges.'
However, the private citizen exception does not apply when the individual is ordered by the military to volunteer or is under the direction of the
military, even if the person is a civilian. In United States v. Chon, 2 the
Ninth Circuit found that the PCA (through its adoption by the Navy) applies
to the Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) even though many of its
agents are civilians and it is directed by a civilian chain of command." 3 The
court's reasoning was that the NCIS furthers the interests of the Navy and
114
that civilian agents hold the same authority as military NCIS personnel.
Further, the Chief of Naval Operations is at the top of the NCIS's
chain of
15
command, and, therefore, directs the operations of the NCIS.
Regardless, the Chon court did not find a PCA violation because it
found that the second common law exception-independent military purpose-applied. 116 Under the independent military purpose exception, the
PCA does not apply when military participation in civil-law enforcement
facilitates a military purpose or enforces the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 1 1'7 This exception usually applies to situations where a violation is committed by a civilian on a military base;' 8 in an action to recover
stolen military property;" 9 in an off-base violation that affects the service-

110.
United States v. Hitchcock, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 (D. Haw. 1999).
Ill.
See generally People v. Blend, 121 Cal. App. 3d 215 (App. Ct. 1981) (finding
no PCA violation where a sailor assisted police while off-duty to secure the dismissal of
pending drug charges, as a civilian might do); State v. Taliferro, 520 N.E.2d 1047 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988) (finding no PCA violation where an airman acted on his own initiative, participating in a drug transaction in the same way as any other private citizen); People v. Burden, 303
N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 1981) (finding no PCA violation where an airman-informant's assistance was of a personal nature, and not related to his military position).
112.
United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2000).
113.
Id. at 994.
114.
Id. at 993.
115.
Id.
116.
See Chon, 210 F.3d at 994.
117.
Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 131 (2003).
118.
See United States v. Santana, 175 F. Supp. 2d 153, 155 (D.P.R. 2001) (holding
that the PCA does not prohibit the military from dealing with on-base violations by civilians).
119.
See United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2000).
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131
23

122
12 1
men on base; 120 or when someone attempts to flee from, to, or across
a base or reservation. This exception has even been invoked in drug stings
that took place entirely off-base because the military was found to have an
independent military
purpose in investigating the sale of drugs to active124
duty personnel.

F.

SOME MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL EXCEPTIONS

In 1981, Congress enacted the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act 25 in an effort to achieve a higher military role in
the War on Drugs, and to clarify the Wounded Knee standards. 26 This Act
authorized the military to aid in the enforcement of drug,2 7immigration, and
tariff laws, and created sweeping exceptions to the PCA.1
The major portions of the Act12 permitted federal, state, and local law
enforcement to share information collected during military operations, 129 to
3
30
use military equipment and facilities, to receive training and advice,' '
and to receive assistance with the maintenance and operation of equipment. 132 These provisions specified that actions such as aerial reconnais-35
34
sance, 133 interception of vessels, and transportation of civilian officials,
which may appear to be direct actions by the military, were explicitly permitted.

120.
United States v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Banks,
539 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1976).
121.
See generally State v. Sanders, 281 S.E.2d 7 (N.C. 1981).
122.
See Commonwealth v. Shadron, 370 A.2d 697, 699-700 (Pa. 1977) (explaining
that a military base is not a sanctuary from state crime).
123.
See McNeil v. State, 787 P.2d 1036, 1037 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (considering
the application of the PCA to a defendant who was driving drunk on a highway that crossed
a reservation).
124.
Moon v. State, 785 P.2d 45, 48 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
125.
Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905, 95 Stat. 1115 (1981) (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. §§ 371-378 (2006)).
126.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 409-10.
127.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 409-10.
128.
Other sections included a reimbursement provision, 10 U.S.C. § 377 (2006), a
non-preemption of other law provision, id. § 378, and an assignment of Coast Guard personnel to naval vessels for law enforcement purposes provision. Id. § 379.
129.
10 U.S.C. § 37 1(a) (2006).
130.
10 U.S.C. § 372(a) (2006).
131.
10 U.S.C. § 373(1)-(2) (2006).
132.
10 U.S.C. § 374(a)(b)(1) (2006).
133.
10 U.S.C. § 374(b)(2)(C) (2006).
134.
10 U.S.C. § 374(b)(2)(D) (2006).
135.
10 U.S.C. § 374(b)(2)(F)(i) (2006).
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The passage of this Act was controversial because it was met with resistance from the military. 13 6 Military leaders were concerned that an expanded role in civil law enforcement would affect the standing army's resources and readiness to respond to nondomestic issues-the primary purpose of the military. 137 Further, military commanders were acutely aware of
the difference in enforcement tactics between the police and the armed services.138
Soldiers are not trained to consider civil liberties or "negotiate"-two
primary roles of police officers; they are trained to force the enemy to submit. 139 Soldiers are equipped with far more destructive weapons and are
permitted to use an initial force that 0would be considered excessive as a
primary response in civilian contexts.14
Congress appeared to address these concerns by placing two other restrictions on the military action authorized by this Act, specifying that: (1)
military support cannot adversely affect military preparedness;' 4 1 and (2)
these amendments do not authorize "direct participation" by the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in search, seizures, arrests, or similar
acts. 142 It is arguable, however, that Congress's main concern was with losing voter support for the
War on Drugs if military action became too ram143
pant in civilian affairs.
Despite these restrictions, the military's involvement in the drug war
continued to expand over the next three years, eventually providing $100
million worth of support and equipment to law enforcement agencies. 144 As
if that were not enough, more exceptions to the PCA followed over the next
ten years. 145 The most significant addition provided for 46
military assistance
in the event of a chemical or biological weapons attacks. 1
Finally, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1984 (amended
in 1988) has been interpreted to permit FEMA to send in active-duty troops
once the President declares a state of emergency in a particular state (usu-

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

141.
142.

Kealy, supra note 29, at 409.
See Kealy, supra note 29, at 409.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 440.
See Kealy, supra note 29, at 439.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 387.

10 U.S.C. § 376 (2006).
10 U.S.C. § 375 (2006).

143.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 412.
144.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 412.
145.
See generally 10 U.S.C. § 380 (2006) (including the enhancement of cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials); see also 10 U.S.C. § 381 (2006) (including the
procurement by state and local governments of law enforcement equipment suitable for
counter-drug activities through the Department of Defense).
146.
10 U.S.C. § 382 (2006).
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ally requested by the Governor).1 47 The Act does not specifically authorize
the use of the military-it simply permits "special
measures" to help state
1 48
and local governments recover from disasters.
G.

POSSE COMITATUS ACT ENFORCEMENT, OR LACK THEREOF

There is no real penalty for violating the Posse Comitatus Act, and no
remedy for the injured party when a PCA
violation occurs. 14 9 To date, no
50
one has been prosecuted under the PCA.1
Perhaps more disturbingly, the exclusionary rule, which suppresses
evidence collected in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights,
generally1 5 1 does not apply to evidence collected when the PCA has been
violated. 152 This means that even though the evidence may have been obtained unlawfully, it can still be used against the defendant at trial.
Some courts have deemed the exclusionary rule an "extraordinary
remedy,"1 53 and unnecessary until there have been "widespread and repeated violations" of the PCA.154 For instance, in United States v. Walden, a
federal court analyzed suppression in the context of a PCA violation for the
55
first time when undercover Marines participated in an illegal arms sting.
The Fourth Circuit did not enforce the exclusionary rule even though the
military personnel had breached156the DOD directive that applied the PCA
restrictions to the Marine Corps.

The court pointed out that one purpose of the exclusionary rule was to
deter searches prohibited by the Fourth Amendment where other remedies
have proved ineffectual. 157 Thus, it was impossible for the court to find,
based on its interpretation, the considerations necessary to apply the exclusionary rule in the case since it was the first known violation of the DOD
directive. 158 The court explained that this directive was not as well known
1 59
or clear (until after this opinion) as the Fourth Amendment prohibitions,
and accordingly, the court adopted a wait-and-see approach-watching for
147.
42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2006).
148.
42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2006).
149.
See United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974).
150.
Kealy, supra note 29, at 405.
151.
State v. Pattioay, 896 P.2d 911, 922 (Haw. 1995) (applying the exclusionary
rule and excluding the evidence at issue in the case).
152.
See generally United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974).
153.
Id. at 373.
154.
Wolffs, 594 F.2d at 85.
155.
Walden, 490 F.2d at 376-77.
156.
Id. at 372.
157.
Id. at 376.
158.
See id. at 376-77.
159.
Id.
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future violations in order to determine whether the exclusionary rule was
needed for deterrence purposes in the PCA context. 60
More recently in State v. Pattioay,161 the Supreme Court of Hawaii
suppressed evidence collected in violation of the PCA because there was no
other penalty for PCA violations-since no one had yet to be prosecuted
under the Act' 62-and because deterring improper police conduct was essential to the operation of the criminal justice system.' 63 So far, this is the
only court to suppress evidence collected in violation of the PCA. Pattioay
may, however, start a trend in that direction, as there is no method
to deter
16
violations thirty years after the initial analysis of this question. 4
There is also no remedy for the defendant when a PCA violation occurs. Courts apply an element-based analysis when reviewing criminal
charges and civil actions where the PCA is implicated. A PCA violation is
not a ground for the dismissal of charges or claims
unless it nullifies an
165
element of the applicable crime or cause of action.
For instance, in Wrynn v. United States, local police used an Air Force
helicopter and personnel to search for an escaped civilian prisoner. 66 The
helicopter clipped a tree while landing and flying debris injured an innocent
bystander. 167 When sued under a respondeat superior theory of liability, the
government claimed that it could not be held liable because the officers
were acting outside of the scope of their duties. 168 The court agreed and
dismissed the complaint, finding that the actions of the officers 169
could not
have been authorized because they were unlawful under the PCA.
Lastly, defendants face a heavy burden of proof. A defendant must
prove that a violation occurred, 170 whereas the prosecution need only demonstrate compliance after the defense is raised. 17 1 A PCA violation defense
also must be raised before trial in a motion to dismiss or to suppress, or it
160.
Id.
161.
State v. Pattioay, 896 P.2d 911 (Haw. 1995). In this case, the Army CID had
participated in a multiple buy, undercover drug sting that occurred off-base and targeted
civilians. Id.
162.
Id. at 923.
163.
Id. at 924-25.
164.
See generally id. The Pattioay court looked to the Walden opinion and pointed
out that the Fourth Circuit seemed willing to adopt the rule if it were needed later. Id. Maybe
future courts will do the same.
165.
See United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975); United States
v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975), affd, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974).
166.
Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
167.
Id. at 461.
168.
Id. at 464.
169.
Id. at 465.
170.
United States v. Ahumedo-Avendano, 872 F.2d 367 (11 th Cir. 1989).
171.
Id. at 373.
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will be waived. 172 This pretrial requirement poses an additional challenge
for defendants who may not know about the military's involvement until
after the trial has begun, if they even find out at all.

III.
A.

THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND THE KATRINA DISASTER

THE DISASTER SCENE

Four days after Hurricane Katrina hit, troops arrived in New Orleans
and began securing the city and attempting to regain order. 73 These troops
consisted of both active-duty military and National Guard troops. 174 It is
unclear 76
precisely how many troops were sent 175 and who was directing their
efforts. 1
The state of affairs in the city at that time was also unclear. As many
Americans watched repeated clips of General Honor6 walking down what
appeared to be safe streets and reaching out to citizens, 77 the Army Times
was quoting National Guardsmen referring to New Orleans as "Little Somalia."' 178 CNN reported some sniper fire during a hospital evacuation, 179 and
the Army Times reported
repeated fire on Black Hawk and Chinook heli80
insurgents.1
by
copters
Many news agencies ran reports about absolute anarchy in the Superdome--estimating a body count of 200, multiple rapes of babies, and serious gang violence. 181 However, only six bodies were recovered from the
Superdome-four died of natural causes, one overdosed on drugs, and an172.
United States v. Borrego, 885 F.2d 822 (11 th Cir. 1989).
173.
Convoys Bring Relief to New Orleans,supra note 8.
174.
Convoys Bring Relief to New Orleans,supra note 8.
175.
See Troops Told 'Shoot to Kill' in New Orleans, supra note 7 (reporting the
arrival of 300 National Guard troops on Sept. 2, 2005); see also Bush to Send More Troops
to Louisiana, supra note I (reporting that 21,000 National Guard troops and 4000 activeduty troops were in Louisiana as of September 3, 2005, and that as of that date, 7000 more
troops were on the way).
176.
Some accounts say that the Governor was commanding them, others imply that
President Bush was.
177.
Lt. Gen. Honore a 'John Wayne Dude', CNN, Sept. 3, 2005, supra note 9.
178.
Joseph R. Chenelly, Troops Begin Combat Operations in New Orleans, ARMY
TIMEs,
Sept.
2,
2005,
available
at
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/090605_worldstories.shtml (quoting Brigadier General Gary Jones, Commander of the Louisiana National Guard's Joint Task Force,
preparing his troops for a citywide security mission in New Orleans).
179.
Relief Workers Confront 'Urban Warfare', supra note 1.
180.
Chenelly, supranote 178.
181.
Brian Thevenot & Gordon Russell, Reports of Anarchy at Superdome Overstated,
SEATrLE
TIMES,
Sept.
26,
2005,
available
at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.comhtml/nationworld/2002520986-katmyth26.html.
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other committed suicide-and there have been no reported rapes.1 82 Of the
1 83
four bodies recovered at the convention center, only one was murdered.
The Governor reported that National Guard troops were "locked and
loaded" and had been told "to shoot and kill 'hoodlums,' 84 while General
Honor6 reported that his National85Guard troops were concerned with the
humanitarian needs of the people.
In the wake of the Katrina crisis, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded, "It didn't," when asked why it took National Guard troops
days to get to New Orleans.186 One month later, the Pentagon and military
blamed the delay on the Posse Comitatus Act, 8 7 claiming that the government would have broken the law by sending active-duty troops to New Orleans.18g Ironically, active-duty troops and the National Guard had shown
up, arguably late, in New Orleans.
B.

THE LEGALITY OF TROOP DEPLOYMENT

Active-duty troops most certainly could have been sent to New Orleans to provide food, water, medical attention, and other non-law enforcement services because the PCA does not bar the military from providing
humanitarian relief; 89 it only restricts certain branches of the military from
"execut[ing] the laws."' 190 This humanitarian relief authority is spelled out
in the Stafford Act, under which the military has been deployed in the wake
of many past domestic disasters, including hurricanes.' 91
Even if authorities expected troop activity to cross the line into a law
enforcement role, Congress could have passed an emergency bill that
granted specific authority to do so.' 92 In fact, Congress did meet in an
emergency session to pass a $10.5 billion bill for relief funds days before

Id.
182.
183.
Id.
184.
Troops Told 'Shoot to Kill' in New Orleans,supra note 7.
185.
Lt. Gen. Honore a 'John Wayne Dude', supra note 9.
Jeff Schogol & Lisa Burgess, Active Duty Troops Won't Be Used for Forcible
186.
Evacuations in New Orleans (It's Illegal), FREE REPUBLIC, Sept. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1480664/posts (quoting Donald Rumsfeld, U.S.
Sec'y of Def., Pentagon Press Briefing (Sept. 6, 2005)).
187.
Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 12, at A15.
188.
Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 12, at A15.
189.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
Id.
190.
Thomas R. Lujan, Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army,
191.
at
http://
82,
available
1997,
at
Autumn
PARAMETERS,
www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97autumn/lujan.htm; Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
5121-5208 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
192.
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the military finally arrived in New Orleans. 193 Congress could also have
passed a military authorization bill at the same time.
A PCA issue could have arisen if federal troops went to New Orleans
for humanitarian purposes but had then taken an active role in law enforcement. There would need to be an alternate grant of authority from the Constitution or Congress for such action, or the troops involved would have to
be unfederalized National Guard and Coast Guard troops.
The following section analyzes the most egregious activity that was
reportedly threatened-forced evacuations of civilians carried out by the
police and military forces-to examine if even that level of military participation would have violated the PCA. 194 1conclude it likely would not.
1.

Military Branch: State or FederalCommand?

In order for the National Guard and active-duty troops to have assumed a law enforcement role in compliance with the PCA, the Governor
of Louisiana ultimately needed to be the one in command of the National
195
Guard forces, with active-duty personnel providing backup support.
196
Based on the news coverage, it was unclear who was in command.
In some statements, the Governor asserted that she had called the National Guard into service and instructed them to enforce the law. 197 In other
news reports, General Honord was said to be in charge of the National
Guard, which appeared to put the guardsmen
under the command of the
98
Army, and ultimately the President.'
According to the National Guard website, the guardsmen were activated under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f), which means that they were in "Full-Time
National Guard Duty."' 199 This statute allows the Governor, with the permission of the President or Secretary of Defense, to call the National Guard
into state service. 200 The command of the guardsmen is squarely under the
193.
Senate Oks $10.5 Billion Disaster Bill, CNN, Sept. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.cnn.com2005POLICTICS/09/01/katrina.congress.
194.
See At Least 30 Found Dead in Nursing Home, CNN, Sept. 8, 2005, availableat
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/07/katrina.impact/ (reporting that on September 6, 2005,
Mayor Ray Nagin purportedly gave the order for the police and military to forcibly evacuate
all citizens remaining in the city of New Orleans).
195.
See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
196.
Lt. Gen. Honore a 'John Wayne Dude', supra note 9; Troops Told 'Shoot to
Kill' in New Orleans, supra note 7.
197.
Troops Told 'Shoot to Kill' in New Orleans,supra note 7.
198.
Lt. Gen. Honore a 'John Wayne Dude', supra note 9.
199.

SEPTEMBER
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.pdf (citing 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) (2000)).
Id. (citing 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) (2000)).
200.
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control of the state, but they are paid through federal funds.20 ' Title 32 National Guardsmen are permitted to partake in domestic law enforcement
without violating the PCA 2
The Sixth Circuit held that guardsmen are officers of the state unless
they are called into federal duty by Congress, and only then can the PCA be
applied to guardsmen who perform law enforcement activities. 0 3
"[L]ook[ing] and act[ing] like soldiers" were specifically found to be irrelevant to determining whether or not the PCA applied to National Guardsmen
in Gilbert v. United States.2°4 Therefore, it seems as though the National
Guard would have been able to execute the laws in New Orleans in compliance with the PCA because the Governor was their acting commander in
chief.
2.

Lawfulness of Forcible Evacuations

Forcible evacuations of civilians would violate the PCA if the military's role was a "direct active use" in enforcing the law with no other applicable exception. 20 5 The common law exceptions-the private citizen and
independent military purpose-most likely would not apply.
The troops present in New Orleans, according to the government, were
deployed by some governmental authority, either federal or state, to act in
their official military capacity.20 6 Thus, as they did not volunteer their assistance, they did not fall under the private citizen exception.2 7 There does not
appear to be an independent military purpose to justify domestic law endirective seemingly had nothing to do
forcement either as the 20evacuation
with military personnel 8 or with retrieving military property. 20 9 Thus, to

201.
Id. at 13 (citing 32 U.S.C. § 502(0 (2000)).
202.
Id. (citing 32 U.S.C. § 502(0 (2000)).
203.
Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999).
204. Id.
205.
See United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 923 (D.S.D. 1975) (noting
that legislative intent is clear that the purpose of the PCA is to prevent the Army or Air
Force from directly executing law enforcement, but that the legislature did not indicate that
the use of military materials would constitute a PCA violation).
Troops Told 'Shoot to Kill' in New Orleans, supra note 7; see also Lt. Gen.
206.
Honore a 'John Wayne Dude', supra note 9.
See generally People v. Taliferro, 520 N.E.2d 1047 (111. App. Ct. 1988) (finding
207.
no violation of the PCA where an airman assisted civilian police, on his own initiative as a
private citizen, in an undercover drug operation wherein the airman posed as a buyer and
used no armed force).
208.
See generally State v. Pattioay, 896 P.2d 911 (Haw. 1995) (finding a PCA violation because there was no showing that the investigation was directed at drug transactions
involving military personnel or transactions conducted on-base).
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comply with the PCA, the role of the active-duty military would need to be
indirect.
Forcibly removing civilians from New Orleans would most likely have
required arrest or forced containment, which would seem to involve a direct
law enforcement activity by the military. In fact, in 10 U.S.C. § 375, Congress clearly states that the military is not authorized to participate in
"search, seizures, arrests, or other similar activit[ies]. '21 °
Additionally, in Bissonette v. Haig, the Eighth Circuit found that roadblocks with armed patrols that formed an "armed perimeter" used to contain
citizens were "regulatory, proscriptive, and compulsory., 211 The court also
pointed out that "regulat[ing], forbid[ding], or compel[ling]" civilians was a
PCA violation.21 2
Further, in United States v. Al-Talib, the Fourth Circuit found that the
use of an Air Force transport during a drug enforcement operation did not
have a direct impact because the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) "did
not use federal troops to invade appellants' homes, nor did it employ the
military to hunt down or confine the suspects.' 2 13 The court hinted that
these actions, which are similar to forcible evacuations, would have been a
PCA violation had they occurred.214

Under this precedent, compelling citizens to leave by forcibly entering
their homes would appear to meet the standard of active participation, especially considering that courts have interpreted the direct participation standard to include much less intrusive activities such as filling out evidence
forms or testing blood samples. 21 5 But, if active-duty personnel were accompanying local law enforcement and acting under their command on the
evacuation missions, some military participation in forcible evacuations
might have been lawful.2 16
209.
See generally United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 910 (2000) (finding no PCA violation by NCIS agents as they were performing an
independent military purpose by trying to recover stolen military equipment).
210.
10 U.S.C. § 375 (2006).
211.
Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th Cir. 1985).
212.
Id. at 1390.
213.
United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 930 (4th Cir. 1995).
214.
Id.
215.
See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 2005) (conducting DUI
blood tests on the behalf of civilian law enforcement violates the PCA because it constitutes
direct participation in civilian law enforcement); Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1982) (holding that the PCA was violated because a military police officer participated
in the drug sting, pulled his gun on the defendant, searched the defendant's home, and personally submitted and filled out the evidence forms).
216.
Contra Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). The court
held that the use of an Air Force helicopter and personnel in a search for an escaped civilian
prisoner was a PCA violation, even though the personnel were under the control of the local
law enforcement. Id. This case took place before the congressional amendments in the 1980s
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In a number of PCA cases, military personnel have accompanied local
law enforcement and have been present for searches, seizures, and arrests,
and have not violated the PCA.21 7 In these cases, the key was that the military personnel were acting under the direction of a non-military authority.
For instance, in United States v. Khan, the Ninth Circuit found no PCA
violation occurred when two Navy ships intercepted a vessel as part of a
civilian investigation into the trafficking of hashish 2 18 because the Navy
personnel had acted under the Coast Guard's command.2 t9 Coast Guard and
Navy personnel boarded the ship, after which, the Coast Guard searched
and seized the vessel and arrested the crew. 220 The Navy's assistance remained indirect because the Navy personnel did not search the ship or arrest
or interrogate suspects; the Navy had only provided "logistical support and
backup 22security,"
which did not amount to an "exercise of military
1
power.,

Similarly, in United States v. Hitchcock, the District of Hawaii found
no PCA violation when two NCIS agents worked on a drug investigation
because the DEA was paying for and directing the operation.222 The NCIS
originally started the investigation and collected the initial evidence through
undercover work.223 After handing the investigation over to the DEA, the
NCIS agents continued to participate in the surveillance and were present
during the search of the defendant's home, his arrest, and his subsequent
interrogation.224 However, the DEA agents had read the defendant his
rights, received and executed the search warrant, and collected and tested

that now permit the military to aid local law enforcement. It is arguable that this case would
now come out differently. As an aside, the government was also claiming a violation of the
PCA in order to disclaim liability in a negligence suit. Id. This may have played a role in the
decision.
217.
United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding no
PCA violation because the Coast Guard members assigned to a Navy ship boarded and
searched the vessel, and detained and arrested the defendant); United States v. Yunis, 924
F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the Navy played a passive role in caring for, housing, and transporting a prisoner in the custody of the FBI); United States v. Hitchcock, 103
F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Haw. 1999) (finding no PCA violation where NCIS agents were present during the search, arrest, and interrogation of the defendant because they were under the
direction of the DEA); United States v. Stouder, 724 F. Supp. 951 (D. Ga. 1989) (finding
that Air Force personnel accompanying FBI agents who were serving a search warrant and
conducting a court-authorized search did not violate the PCA).
218.
United States v. Khan, 35 F.3d 426, 428 (9th Cir. 1994).
219.
id. at 431-32.
220.
Id. at 428.
221.
Id. at 432.
222.
United States v. Hitchcock, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229-30 (D. Haw. 1999).
223.
Id. at 1226-27.
224.
Id. at 1227.
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all the evidence. 225 In the end, the court found that the NCIS involvement
was indirect and did not violate the PCA.22 6
According to the reasoning in Kahn and Hitchcock, the military probably could have assisted New Orleans police in forced evacuations provided
that military personnel remained under the command of civilian (or federalized National Guard) authorities. For example, two police officers being
transported in an amphibious vehicle by three Army soldiers would most
likely comply with the PCA so long as any actual detainment was executed
by the civilian police officers. In Kahn, the court specified that "backup
support," a role that would require the military personnel to carry weapons,
was passive.2 27
Army personnel could also independently transport civilians once they
were taken into police custody. In United States v. McArthur, the Army's
transportation of a defendant in the custody of U.S. Marshals was lawful
under the PCA.228 Likewise, in United States v. Yunis, the Navy acted lawfully by caring for, housing, and transporting a civilian in FBI custody.229
The ratio of police to military personnel might logically seem like a
good way to measure involvement, yet courts have not paid much attention
to numbers. For example, in Hitchcock there were many DEA agents working with two NCIS agents, while in Kahn, there were many more Navy
personnel than Coast Guard.23 °
In both of these cases, the courts focused on who was in charge of the
operation without regard to the ratio of civilian to military personnel. In
Hitchcock, the court found that the DEA was in charge of the operation
because it was directing the mission. 31 In Kahn, the court found that the
Coast Guard was running the mission because it was directing Navy personnel.232
As evidenced by the aforementioned cases, the analysis performed by
courts when determining the extent of military involvement is highly factsensitive and specific to the situation at hand. Thus, it is not clear what criteria a court would use to determine if local law enforcement, and not the
military, were in control of an operation and how such criteria would apply
to the activities in New Orleans following Katrina.
225.
Id. at 1229.
226.
Id. at 1230.
227.
United States v. Kahn, 35 F.3d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 1994).
228.
United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d
1275 (8th Cir. 1976).
229.
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
230.
United States v. Hitchcock, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229-30 (D. Haw. 1999);
Kahn, 35 F.3d at 432.
231.
Hitchcock, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1229-30.
232.
Kahn, 35 F.3d at 432.
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For example, the ratio of civilian law enforcement to military personnel in New Orleans after Katrina was far more disparate than the ratios in
Kahn and Hitchcock, and, therefore, might influence a court's analysis. It
was reported that much of the New Orleans police force, which before the
hurricane numbered about 1000 strong, abandoned their posts. 233 Depending on whose numbers are accurate, there were as many as 40,000 troops in
the area.234 Thus, the New Orleans police force was significantly outnumbered (40:1) by the military. With such a gap in numbers, it is hard to
see how the civilian authority could be in charge of the operation in any
meaningful way.
Likewise, the military would probably provide most, if not all, of the
equipment used to execute evacuations as it is likely that the New Orleans
equipment was destroyed during the hurricane. Plus, military personnel
were specially trained and better equipped to deal with disasters of such
magnitude. This would mean that the military would be funding most of the
operation-by virtue of supplying the equipment and effectively running
the operation-if the civilian authority deferred to the special training of the
military personnel.
For all intents and purposes, the military would be in control of the
evacuations based on the number of personnel and the source of funding
and direction of operations. However, it is quite possible that, if litigated, a
court would still not find a PCA violation. Based on the Wounded Knee
Cases, military experts are permitted to play an extensive role in advising
public officials on how to execute evacuation missions. Under McArthur,
the New Orleans civilian authorities would be "borrow[ing the advisor] as a
vehicle might be borrowed, ' 35 which is permitted under the PCA through a
congressional exception allowing the military to share equipment with civilian law enforcement. 6
As evidenced by the preceding discussion, it is difficult-if not impossible-to reconcile the various court holdings in order to generate one hardand-fast rule on how to evaluate the extent of military involvement in law
enforcement activities for purposes of a PCA analysis. Still, some factual
parallels can be drawn. Following those parallels, it would seem that the
most egregious suggested conduct-forcible evacuations-could have been
legitimately conducted in New Orleans with the extensive aid of military
personnel and not have violated the Posse Comitatus Act.
233.
Varney, supra note 2.
234.
The Associated Press reported that as of September 3, 2005, 21,000 National
Guard troops and 4000 active-duty troops were in New Orleans, and 7000 more were on
their way as of that date. Bush to Send More Troops to Louisiana,supra note 1.
235.
United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 195 (D.N.D. 1975), affd, 541
F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976).
236.
10 U.S.C. §§ 372-374 (2006).
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PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY

It is arguable that the President could have sent the military into New
Orleans under 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-332, which permits the President to summon the militia to stop insurrection and to protect the constitutional rights
of the American people. While the actions of the Confederate States during
the Civil War are generally what is thought of as an insurrection,2 37 courts
have adopted a broader view by defining insurrection as "a rising against
civil or political authority; the open and active opposition of a number of
persons to the execution of law in [a] city or state. 2 38
it
Insurrection does not require violence or a probability of success; 239
needs to "for the time being defy the authority of the United States.',
Those resisting the power of the civil authorities are known as "insurgents,"
and anyone-regardless of their motives 24°-that participates is considered
241
an insurgent.
Under 10 U.S.C. § 333, the President can summon the militia when the
"authorities of [a] State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect" the rights,
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. 242 Courts have
interpreted this statute to mean that the President can order the militia to
protect fundamental rights, such as the right to interstate travel.243 Presidents Grant, Eisenhower, and Kennedy used this power to "remove obstructions of justice" that "den[ied] the equal protection of the law," and to
"quell the domestic violence" in conjunction with civil rights abuses. 2 "
The President does not need the permission of a state or Congress to
call the militia.245 The decision to call troops to quell civil disorder is exclusively delegated to the President and is not subject to judicial review.24 6
The situation in New Orleans appeared to meet the requirements for
both sections 331 and 333 on many levels. It is true that many of the horrors

237.
See Stevens v. Griffith, 111 U.S. 48 (1884).
238.
In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828, 830 (1894). A grand jury was called to
determine whether the offenses committed during a railroad union strike should be prosecuted. Id. This is how the judge instructed the jury on what "insurrection" meant. Id.
239.
Id.
This raises an interesting question regarding the people who were looting for
240.
food during the Katrina disaster.
241.
See In re Charge to GrandJury, 62 F. at 830.
242.
10 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353, 1401 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (finding
243.
that the President could have sent the military to protect the rights of African-American
citizens where a white supremacist group was planning on blocking [with force if necessary]
the African-American citizens from disembarking and entering a bus station).
Id. at 1401-02.
244.
See generally id. at 1403.
245.
246.
Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55
(D.C.D.C. 1973).
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described in the days immediately following the hurricane were exaggerated.247 However, national news stations like CNN ran virtually nonstop
live coverage, which broadcasted an undeniable and grim picture. This picture included houses engulfed up to their roofs in polluted water, people
carrying everything from TVs to cartons of diapers out of ransacked local
shops, dead bodies lying on the roads and floating in the water, and thousands of people sitting in blistering heat without food or water.248 Virtually
all of the refugees were poor,249African-American citizens; virtually all of the
local police force was white.
The "insurrection" in New Orleans was documented both in written
and video newscasts. Several spokespeople, including former FEMA Director Michael Brown, equated the situation in New Orleans to "urban warfare. 250 National Guardsmen discussed being shot at by insurgents.25 1
Widespread looting and gangs of armed men were said to be making the
city unsafe.252
Local police were not able to quell the disorder; in fact, some of the
officers joined the looters.253 Local authorities were not able to evacuate
critical patients from Charity Hospital due to sniper fire and run-ins with
armed looters. 254 Mayor Nagin made multiple passionate pleas for help as
the city was out of control and citizens were dying.25 5 Governor Blanco sent
in 300 National Guardsmen with permission to use deadly force, but that
number paled in comparison to the 20,000 people that were stranded in the
Superdome alone.256
The denial of the fundamental rights and the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Constitution was televised and splashed through the
papers. Buses that citizens had rented, by pooling their money, to bring
247.
248.

Thevenot & Russell, supra note 181.
Stadium Hurricane Refige Like a 'Concentration Camp', AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0902-06.htm.
249.
Washington, supra note 5.
250.
Relief Workers Confront 'Urban Warfare', supra note 1.
251.
Chenelly, supra note 178.
252.
Relief Workers Confront 'Urban Warfare', supra note 1.
253.
Four officers have been suspended without pay and more than a dozen are under
investigation in conjunction with participating in or not combating looting. Varney, supra
note 2, at 3.
254.
Sniper Fire Halts Hospital Evacuation, supra note 3, at 3. On two occasions,
evacuations of critical patients to Tulane Medical Center (to heliport out) were stopped when
a sniper began firing on evacuees. Sniper Fire HaltsHospital Evacuation, supra note 3, at 3.
Earlier, boat evacuations were interrupted when armed looters threatened evacuees--even
overturning one of their boats. Sniper Fire Halts Hospital Evacuation,supra note 3, at 3.
255.
Jim Drinkard & Tom Vanden Brook, The Response and Responsibilities in a
Disaster,USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2005, at 4A.
256.
Troops Told 'Shoot to Kill' in New Orleans,supra note 7.
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them out of the city were confiscated by authorities.25 7 Families were splitup and forced to leave their pets behind to slowly starve to death. 258 Citizens were not permitted by law enforcement personnel to leave a city where
there was no food, water, medication, or sanitation. 259 Police fired warning
shots in response to those people who managed to walk a few miles in an
attempt to cross the Crescent City Connection Bridge out of New Orleans
and into Gretna. 260 Police allegedly used helicopters to blow down shelters,

fired shots to corral refugees, and confiscated citizens' food and water.26 1
When the buses finally did arrive, it was reported26that
white tourists were
2
bumped to the front of the line and evacuated first.
263
The government claimed disparate impact-these people were poor
and happened to be African-American; 264 however, this disparate impact,
combined with Louisiana's slave state past 265 and New Orleans's reputation

257.
Chip Johnson, Police Made Their Storm Misery Worse, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 9,
2005 at B 1. A number of European and white tourists staying at a hotel in the French Quarter pooled their money and came up with $25,000. Id. They rented ten buses and devised a
plan to send elderly, sick, and minors out first. Id. The National Guard commandeered them
when they arrived in New Orleans. Id.
258.
Peggy Mihelich, Pet Rescuers Race Against Time, CNN, Sept. 9, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/20O5/US/09/08/pet.rescue/index.html. Many citizens refused to leave
their pets and remained in unsafe conditions in their homes in order care for their furry family members. Id.
259.
Chip Johnson, Police Made Their Storm Misery Worse, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 9,
2005, at B 1. This article contains an account of two paramedics who were in New Orleans
for a conference and were stranded in the French Quarter for days. Id. Both the police and
the National Guard were perpetrating these acts. Id. at B10. These authorities were apparently not listening to the Mayor who was quoted as telling citizens to flee to the neighboring
Jefferson Parish because the convention center was not safe. Relief Workers Confront 'Urban Warfare', supra note 1.
260.
Chip Johnson, Police Made Their Storm Misery Worse, S. F. CHRON., Sept. 9,
2005, at B10. The town of Gretna is few miles away from the Superdome. Id. When the
people from the French Quarter were refused entrance to either of the shelters, they decided
to walk to the bridge in order to cross the river into the neighboring city. Id. The Gretna
police refused to allow them to enter, explaining that they did not want New Orleans to
happen in their town. Id. According to the 2000 United States Census Bureau, Gretna is 56%
white. U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html.
261.
Chip Johnson, Police Made Their Storm Misery Worse, S. F. CHRON., Sept. 9,
2005, at B10.
262.
Id.
263.
Kate Sheehy, Barbara:Houston Shelter is 'Working Very Well'for Poor, N.Y.
POST, Sept. 6, 2005, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0906-01.htm.
Barbara Bush commented about the situation for refugees at the Superdome on NPR: "So
many of the people here ... were underprivileged anyway, so this is working very well for
them." Id.
264.
Washington, supra note 5.
265.
See Daniel Gilbert, Slavery Scholar Compares Cuba and Louisiana, CHI.
MAROON, Jan. 21, 2005, http://www.chicagomaroon.com/onlineedition/article/5103.
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for race-divided neighborhoods,2 66 makes this explanation suspect. The
local response to Katrina recalled images of the civil rights violations perpetrated in the '60s and '70s-which often arose from mobility restrictions
enforced against African-American citizens.267 Surely, the totality of the
circumstances
met the low threshold of a "mere frustration" 268 and justified
presidential deployment
of the military under the Insurrection Acts.
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT IS NOT TO BLAME

Soon after troops began arriving in New Orleans, television news
broadcasts repeatedly showed footage of General Honor6 yelling at a group
of soldiers in the back of a pickup truck who were training their M- 16s on
haggard-looking civilian men, women, and children. The General said:
"Point your weapons to the ground, this is not Iraq." 269 The soldiers epitomized a posse comitatus and appeared to be playing out a scene from a developing country run by aberrant gangs.
Scenes like this were precisely why the PCA was passed: to enforce
civilian authority over the military in order to maintain a democratic form
of government. Unfortunately, Congress and the courts have created so
many exceptions that the PCA has lost its teeth. The modern PCA appears
to be nothing more than a legacy law.
While many questions regarding the government's response to Katrina
remain unanswered, one answer is clear: the PCA was not the obstacle delaying the government's provision of humanitarian aid.
The PCA does not bar the government from rapidly deploying the
standing military to bring food, water, and medicine to citizens in desperate
need after a disaster. 270 If it did, we would not have deployed the military to
provide aid in the wake of earlier hurricanes.27 1
If the government had been concerned about violating the PCA, Congress could have passed a bill during its emergency Katrina relief session in
266.

Alan Shapiro, The Class and Race Divide in New Orleans and in America,
http://www.teachablemoment.org/high/raceclass.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2008). The Lower Ninth Ward, where flooding was the worst, has been reported as
98% African-American with an average annual income of $27,500-approximately 25% of
those people have an income below $10,000. Id.
267.
Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353, 1401 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (holding
that a Ku Klux Klan plan to block African-American citizens from leaving a bus station
justified sending in the military to protect the fundamental right of mobility).
268.
10 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
269.
Convoys Bring Relief to New Orleans,supra note 8.
270.
The text of the PCA specifies that it applies to the execution of the laws, as
discussed supra. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
271.
See Lujan, supra note 191.
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order to grant specific military authority in New Orleans.272 Or, the government could have knowingly violated the PCA-most likely without penalty. To date, no one has been prosecuted under the PCA and it is doubtful
that prosecutions would commence with the Secretary of Defense or the
President as the first defendants.
Most tellingly, how unlawful could the military deployment have
been? The government did send active-duty troops-it just sent them several days late. The only thing that changed during those four days was
President Bush's approval rating.2 73
Since the finger was pointed at the PCA, the Katrina disaster has
seemingly become the poster child for repealing the PCA's protections. A
proper analysis of the law-and all of its exceptions-shows that this is an
unnecessary step.
Rather than blurring the lines between the military and civilian authority by repealing the PCA, the government ought to focus its energies on
fixing communication channels and emergency operation plans so that we
do not have a repeat of the Katrina disaster. Americans depend on their
government to protect them from many dangers--domestic and foreign
enemies and natural disasters alike.
The government's response to the Katrina disaster was simply unacceptable and paled in comparison to the response to the terrorist attacks of
9/11. The picture this juxtaposition paints is that we as a country can respond quickly when the matter involves a major financial district and
largely wealthy citizens, but that we squabble over who should provide
support when it comes to a cultural center and largely poor citizens.
The government has used the Posse Comitatus Act as a smokescreen
for its failures to the American people during the Katrina disaster. We must
reject the government's excuse for the misrepresentation that it is. We must
hold the government accountable and demand that it fix the breakdown that
caused the delay of humanitarian aid to the citizens of New Orleans.

272.
Senate OKs $10.5 Billion DisasterBill, supra note 193.
273.
Bush Approval Rating at 40 Percent, CNN, Sept. 19, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLMCS/09/19/bush.poll. Shortly after the Katrina disaster, a
poll showed that 57% of adults disapproved of his handling of Katrina. Id.

